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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Judges are often said to enjoy a certain “mystique” that arises immediately 
upon their election or appointment to the bench.
1
  To some extent, this phenome-
non may be based on the belief that judges are, in Blackstone’s words, “the ‘de-
positories of the law; the living oracles.’”2  However, this sense of awe may also 
be attributable to the shroud of secrecy that surrounds much of what judges do.
3
 
Although society would doubtless benefit from an increased understanding of 
a number of types of judicial behaviors (for example, judicial deliberation and 
decision-making), there is one issue about which virtually nothing is known, 
namely the means by which a new judge learns the art of judging.
4
  Unlike judges 
in civil law countries, who undertake specialized coursework in judicial studies 
from the earliest stages of their careers,
5
 judges in the United States typically 
“[take] the oath, [step] onto the bench, and [proceed] to fill the judicial role as if 
born in the robe.”6  This tradition, which is rooted in medieval English practice, is 
based on the assumption that anyone who has become a senior litigator is suffi-
ciently well-prepared to act as a judge.
7
 
Although this approach may have been acceptable in the Middle Ages, much 
has changed since then.  Not only has the legal community recognized that acting 
as a judge is not the same as acting as an advocate,
8
 but the duties of a judge have 
                                                          
 1 Emily Kadens, The Puzzle of Judicial Education: The Case of Chief Justice William de Grey, 75 
BROOK. L. REV. 143, 145 (2009); see also Charles Fried, A Meditation on Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1227, 1227 (2004) (“There is an aura about judges that we do not want them to dissipate . . . .”). 
 2 See Kadens, supra note 1, at 145 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69). 
 3 Lawyers and lay people are often fascinated by first-hand, “insider” reports of what goes on 
behind chambers doors.  Thus, books authored by former clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court are often in 
high demand, since they are seen as a means of demystifying certain aspects of the judicial process.  
See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN 
SUPREME COURT (1998); TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006); TODD C. PEPPERS & ARTEMUS WARD, IN 
CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES (2013); ARTEMUS WARD 
& DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERER’S APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2006). 
 4 See Kadens, supra note 1, at 143-46.  Some commentators refer to the process of learning how to 
be a judge as “socialization” rather than education.  See id. at 146 (including citations). 
 5 See id. at 145; Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design as the 
Model for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139, 143 (2004). 
 6 Kadens, supra note 1, at 143.  Although some proposals have been made regarding the develop-
ment of a form of pre-appointment training, that approach is still in its infancy and will in any case be 
voluntary in nature.  See ABA, Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, Report to the House of 
Delegates, Recommendation No. 113, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
leadership/2009/midyear/recommendations/113.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2015).  Some 
observers suggest that U.S. law schools should undertake efforts to educate future judges about issues 
relating to adjudication.  See Sande L. Buhai et al., The Role of Law Schools in Educating Judges to 
Increase Access to Justice, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 161, nn. 115-59 (2011). 
 7 See Kadens, supra note 1, at 144. 
 8 See Keith R. Fisher, Education for Judicial Aspirants, 43 AKRON L. REV. 163, 168-69 (2010); 
Kadens, supra note 1, at 143-44. 
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changed significantly since medieval times.
9
  Furthermore, the various methods of 
selecting judges in the United States (which includes judicial appointments, judi-
cial elections and various combinations of the two procedures) are quite different 
than those used in sixteenth century England.
10
  In fact, there is no constitutional 
requirement that judges in the United States be qualified as lawyers, which allows 
a significant number of non-legally-trained individuals to sit as judges.
11
 
Concerns about judicial preparedness led to major reforms in the 1960s and 
1970s, when the United States became the first common law country to adopt a 
system of judicial education.
12
  Over the years, judicial education has become “big 
business” in the United States, and numerous public and private institutions now 
offer educational programming to both state and federal judges.
13
  However, re-
quirements regarding judicial education vary considerably across the nation,
14
 
                                                          
 9 See Fisher, supra note 8, at 182-85.  For example, judicial caseloads have increased dramatical-
ly, particularly in the last few decades.  See S.I. Strong, Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A 
Guide For Novice, Experienced and Foreign Judges, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 93, 95 [hereinafter Strong, 
Writing].  Judges are also having to take on additional duties, ranging from case management (leading 
to the rise of the “managerial” judge rather than the professional adjudicator) to alternative dispute 
resolution (as a result of the increased emphasis on settlement).  See Fisher, supra note 8, at 170, 182; 
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982). 
 10 See Barbara F. Berenson, Book Review, The People’s Court: Pursuing Judicial Independence in 
America By Jed Handelsman Shugerman, 94 MASS. L. REV. 147, 147 (2013) (reviewing JED 
HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURT: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 
(2012)); Kadens, supra note 1, at 144-45. 
 11 See North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 339 (1976); Sylvia A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the Con-
stitution?  The Case of Mayors and Marriage Equality, 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1, 11 
(2007) (noting “in the early years of the Republic many judges were not lawyers and, even today, 
many judges are not”); Paul Biederman, An Education Revolution From the Field, SCH. REFORMED 
(Dec. 5, 2012), https://schoolreformed.wordpress.com/2012/12/05/post-13-an-education-revolution-
from-the-field-continued/ (noting that “in our state, most magistrate, municipal and probate judges, as 
well as most tribal court judges, never went to law school; many never even completed college”). 
 12 See LIVINGSTON ARMYTAGE, EDUCATING JUDGES: TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF CONTINUING 
JUDICIAL LEARNING 12-14 (1996); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (2015) (establishing the Federal 
Judicial Center in 1967); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., www.fjc.gov (last visited Aug. 7, 2015) [hereinafter FJC 
Website]. 
 13 ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 14 (citation omitted).  Perhaps the most well-respected judicial 
education center in the United States is the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), which focuses on research 
and education of the federal judiciary.  See FJC Website, supra note 12.  A number of states have their 
own judicial education programs, although many states also rely on the services of the National Judi-
cial College, a Nevada-based non-profit originally created by the American Bar Association, to edu-
cate their judges.  See NAT’L JUDICIAL COUNCIL, http://www.judges.org/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2015); 
ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 13.  For-profit judicial education institutions also exist, although some 
questions have been raised about the objectivity of privately funded programming.  See CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY, Corporations, Pro-Business Nonprofits Foot Bill for Judicial Seminars (May 27, 2014) 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/03/28/12368/corporations-pro-business-nonprofits-foot-bill-
judicial-seminars (noting that “[c]onservative foundations, multinational oil companies and a prescrip-
tion drug maker were the most frequent sponsors of more than 100 expense-paid educational seminars 
attended by federal judges over a 4 ½ year period”); Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately 
Funded Educational Programs?  Should Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial 
Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 941, 941-44 (2002). 
 14 See NAT’L JUDICIAL EDUC. PROGRAM, Testimony to the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct 15 (Apr. 2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/judicialethics/resources/Comm_Code_HechtSchafran_0504ddt.authcheckdam.pdf; 
ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 13, 29-40; Patricia H. Murrell & Philip D. Gould, Educating for Thera-
peutic Judging: Strategies, Concepts, and Outcomes, 78 REV. JUR. U. P. R. 129, 136 (2009). 
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with some courts—most notably those in the federal system—failing to require 
their judges to participate in any educational programming whatsoever.
15
 
While the initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s represent a significant move 
forward, a number of problems still remain.
16
  One of the most pressing issues 
involves the degree of control exerted by the judiciary over the scope, content and 
methods of judicial education.  Conventional wisdom suggests that the judiciary 
should “take primary responsibility for providing continuing judicial education,” a 
view that is based on claims of expertise (i.e., the belief that only judges can ap-
preciate the particular pressures and demands of acting as a judge and thus are the 
only persons qualified to act as instructors) and the need to protect judicial inde-
pendence.
17
  However, questions have been raised in a variety of contexts about 
the propriety of self-regulation, since self-interest may tempt individuals to act in 
a manner that is contrary to the public interest.
18
  Concerns about self-regulation 
may be particularly pressing in cases involving judicial education, given the role 
that the judiciary plays in a well-ordered society.
19
 
It is possible to explain the current approach to judicial education in relatively 
benign terms.  For example, the large degree of judicial control over judicial edu-
cation may simply be the result of acculturation and tradition.
20
  However, the 
                                                          
 15 By tradition, most if not all incoming federal judges attend new judge orientation sessions of-
fered by the Federal Judicial Center.  However, participation is purely voluntary. 
 16 One of the most pressing issues concerns funding for judicial education.  See ABA Commission 
on the 21st Century Judiciary, Preserving the Judiciary’s Institutional Legitimacy, 37 BRIEF 54, 56-57 
(2008), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/tips/faic/16_PreservingJudiciary.pdf.  Without public 
funding, judges may resort to privately funded educational programs, which carry with them the risk of 
political influence and bias.  See CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 13; Green, supra note 13, at 
941-44. 
 17 ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, supra note 16, at 56; see also CHERYL 
THOMAS, REVIEW OF JUDICIAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 32-33 (May 
2006) (constituting a report prepared for the British Judicial Studies Board), available at 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/socio-legal/docs/Review_of_Judicial_Train.pdf; J. Clifford Wallace, Judi-
cial Education and Training in Asia and the Pacific, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 849, 858-59 (2000) [herein-
after Wallace, Asia]. 
 18 See Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons From Financial 
Regulation, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 441, 442-43, 465 (discussing self-regulation and the recent financial 
crisis); Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 
977, 1016 (2003) (discussing self-regulation of the legal profession).  Although proponents of “new 
governance theory” praise the departure from a “command and control” model of regulation toward 
self-regulation, they do not advocate an entirely deregulated approach.  See IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992) 
(“Good policy analysis is not about choosing between the free market and government regulation . . . 
sound policy analysis is about understanding private regulation . . . and how it is interdependent with 
state regulation.”); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
875, 882 (2003) (suggesting “the way past the current impasse is to return to [a] commitment to a legal 
decisionmaking process that is deeply informed about the institutions with which legal actors inter-
act”); On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and 
Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2100 (2008) (reviewing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
STUMBLE, PREDICT, NUDGE: HOW BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS INFORMS LAW AND POLICY (2008) and 
DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008)). 
 19 See Jonathan Lippman, A Proactive Judicial Bench: Confronting the Crisis of the Unrepresent-
ed, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1 (discussing the role of the judiciary in a well-functioning socie-
ty). 
 20 See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Prob-
lems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 792, 797 (1980) (noting overexposure to problem-
atic practices dulls perception of impropriety); Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil 
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Regulatory capture (also known as “agency capture”) arises when an “orga-
nized interest group[] successfully act[s] to vindicate [its] goals through govern-
ment policy at the expense of the public interest.”22  Applying this principle to 
judicial education may seem somewhat strange, since the judiciary cannot be con-
sidered to be either an “agency” in the technical sense or a special interest group.23  
In fact, the judicial branch is often considered to be the primary means of combat-
ting regulatory capture.
24
  However, concerns about capture appear to be appropri-
ate here, based on (1) the high degree of control currently wielded by the judiciary 
on matters relating to judicial education; (2) resistance by judges to any independ-
ent external oversight on matters relating to judicial education; and (3) the poten-
tially significant number of negative externalities generated by the current sys-
tem.
25
  As a result, the existing approach to judicial education can arguably be said 
to meet the classic definition of agency capture.
26
 
                                                          
Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1343 (1978) (noting that 
judges are also subject to the pressure of acculturation). 
 21 See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013). 
 22 Id. at 1340; see also Dorit Rubenstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
569, 578 (2012). 
 23 What constitutes an agency in U.S. law is a complicated issue, but the judiciary, as separate 
branch of government, would not be included in any of those definitions.  See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) 
(2015) (defining “agency” for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act and excluding “the courts 
of the United States”); see also Kimberly N. Brown, Presidential Control of the Elite “Non-Agency,” 
88 N.C. L. REV. 71, 72-73 (2009) (defining various types of hybrid or independent agencies).  Howev-
er, there are two agencies—the FJC and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC)—that 
are affiliated with the U.S. federal judiciary.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (2015) (establishing the 
AOUSC); 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (2015) (establishing the FJC); Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/ 
AdministrativeOffice.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2015); FJC Website, supra note 12. 
 24 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 61-63 
(1985). 
 25 See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 150; THOMAS, supra note 17, at 32-33; Wallace, Asia, supra 
note 17, at 858-59; see also NAT’L JUDICIAL EDUC. PROGRAM, supra note 14, at 15.  Here, negative 
externalities might include costs associated with judicial inefficiency related to poor case management 
skills or generated as a result of appeals resulting from poor judicial practices.  See Lillian R. BeVier, 
Law, Economics, and the Power of State, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8 n.13 (1997) (defining a 
negative externality as arising “when some costs of an activity spill over to parties not directly in-
volved in the activity” in question). 
 26 Notably, 
[t]he literature uses a variety of definitions to explain the results or features of capture. 
One definition suggests that in a situation of capture, regulated industry members 
“persuade regulators to alter rules or be lenient in enforcing those rules.”  A somewhat 
different definition emphasizes the consequences, suggesting that captured regulatory 
agencies are “persistently serving the interests of regulated industries to the neglect or 
harm of more general, or ‘public,’ interests.  . . . [T]he accusation implies excessive 
regulated industry influence on regulatory agencies.” 
Reiss, supra note 22, at 578 (footnotes omitted).  Regulatory capture can arise despite the best intent of 
the public officials involved.  See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagno-
sis, Causality, and Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 222 (2012) (noting “regulatory 
capture can occur despite the desire of public officials to protect the public” and discussing “how 
regulated entities are able to dominate the presentation of information to agencies, producing infor-
mation asymmetries that make it more likely agencies will adopt industry-favored policies”). 
5
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Although some scholars have declined to characterize the concept of capture 
as either positive or negative,
27
 regulatory capture is generally considered prob-
lematic from both a practical and theoretical perspective.
28
  Capture of the judici-
ary could be particularly harmful, given the connection between a well-
functioning judiciary and an effective system of justice.
29
 
This phenomenon suggests a pressing need for further scrutiny into matters 
relating to the education of judges in this country.
30
  This Essay therefore consid-
ers of a number of fundamental issues relating to judicial education in the United 
States so as to consider, at least as a preliminary matter, whether regulatory cap-
ture exists.  Given the scope of this Essay, some issues are necessarily excluded.
31
  
Nevertheless, this Essay hopes to trigger a deeper debate about judicial education 
in this country. 
The structure of the analysis is as follows.  First, the Essay considers certain 
obstacles to research concerning judicial education as a means of determining why 
more scholars have not sounded an alarm regarding practices in this field (Section 
II).  The Essay then addresses a number of issues relating to the current approach 
to judicial education to determine whether and to what extent judicial control over 
this issue can be considered problematic (Section III).  That analysis leads logical-
ly into a discussion of various ways that the possibility of regulatory capture of 
judicial education could be diminished (Section IV).  Finally, the Essay concludes 
by drawing together various strands of analysis (Section VI). 
II.  INVISIBLE BARRIERS TO SCHOLARLY SCRUTINY OF JUDICIAL 
EDUCATION 
In many ways, the reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s marked the high 
point for scholarly interest in judicial education.
32
  Recent years have seen a sig-
nificant shortage of critical commentary in this field,
33
 which is somewhat prob-
                                                          
 27 See Reiss, supra note 22, at 571-72. 
 28 See David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 333-35 (2014). 
 29 See Lippman, supra note 19, at 1. 
 30 Notably, the diversity of judicial education centers in the United States does not offset the claim 
that judicial education has been subject to regulatory capture by the judiciary, if, as appears to be the 
case, control over the content and method of educational programming is controlled directly or indi-
rectly by judges.  See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text (discussing individual and institution-
al influences). 
 31 For example, this discussion does not reflect a detailed discussion of the number and types of 
negative externalities that arise as a result from the current approach to judicial education, although 
certain types of empirical data suggests such negative externalities do exist.  See supra note 25 (defin-
ing negative externalities); see also infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (regarding public percep-
tion of the judiciary and improper judicial behavior). 
 32 See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 12-13. 
 33 See Kadens, supra note 1, at 144-45 (“[S]cholars . . . of the judiciary have paid limited attention 
to the question of how an appointee learns to be a judge.”); THOMAS, supra note 17, at 113 (noting 
“there have been few major developments in this field since the 1970s”).  The academic literature on 
judicial education is relatively sparse and largely outdated.  See Diane E. Cowdrey, Educating Into the 
Future: Creating an Effective System of Judicial Education, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 885, 889 (2010) (sug-
gesting very little discussion exists regarding both the primary purpose of judicial education and how 
that purpose is to be achieved); Virginia A. Hettinger et al., Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion 
Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792, 792-93 (2003) (citing scholarship); 
Kadens, supra note 1, at 144-45 & nn. 2, 4 (providing citations regarding the socialization of judges 
and the existence of judicial education centers that are almost entirely from the 1970s and 1980s).  
There are a number of judicially-authored pieces, but those tend to be written from an anecdotal rather 
6
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lematic for the current discussion, given that questions regarding regulatory cap-
ture should be considered within a larger analytical context.
34
 
To some extent, the lack of scholarship in this field could signal a consensus 
that the problems of judicial education have been resolved.  That issue will be 
considered in Section III in conjunction with issues relating to regulatory cap-
ture.
35
  However, the dearth of critical commentary in this area of law could be the 
result of other factors.  Indeed, closer analysis suggests that scholarly research into 
judicial education has been hindered by a number of “invisible barriers” that have 
little, if anything, to do with the quality and nature of judicial education in this 
country. 
Analysis of these “invisible barriers” is important because these obstacles do 
more than impede independent evaluation of the way in which judges learn how to 
carry out their judicial functions.  Instead, these phenomena describe why the 
judiciary is reluctant to cede control over judicial education and why regulatory 
capture may have occurred. 
It is impossible to consider all potential barriers to legal education in the 
scope of the current Essay.
36
  Instead, this section will focus on three issues that 
are particularly relevant to the current discussion: the lack of consensus as to the 
role and function of judges; a belief that other mechanisms, such as judicial selec-
tion procedures, are adequate to create a well-functioning and well-informed judi-
ciary; and concerns about the extent to which judicial education infringes on judi-
cial independence. 
                                                          
than scholarly perspective and are therefore not perhaps as objective as one might hope.  See Chad M. 
Oldfather, Book Review, Oral History and the Study of the Judiciary, 78 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 846, 
849 (2010); see also Lenore Alpert et al., Becoming A Judge: The Transition From Advocate to Arbi-
ter, 62 JUDICATURE 325 (Feb. 1979); Charles S. Claxton, Characteristics of Effective Judicial Educa-
tion Programs, 76 JUDICATURE 11 (Jun.-Jul. 1992); Susanne DiPietro et al., Judicial Qualifications 
and Judicial Performance: Is There a Relationship?, 83 JUDICATURE 196 (Jan.-Feb. 2000); Henry J. 
Friendly, Reflections On A Lawyer Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L. J. 218 (1961); Jessie B. Gunther, 
Reflections on the Challenging Proliferation of Mental Health Issues in the District Court and the 
Need for Judicial Education, 57 ME. L. REV. 541 (2005); Aaron Ment, The Transition from Lawyer to 
Judge: Connecticut’s Pre-Bench Orientation Program, 73 JUDICATURE 281 (Feb.-Mar. 1990); Patricia 
H. Murrell et al., Courts as Learning Organizations: Toward a Unifying Vision, 93 JUDICATURE 14 
(July-Aug. 2009); Paul Nejelski, Symposium Seeks New Approaches to Judicial Education, 74 
JUDICATURE 104 (Aug.-Sep. 1990); On Becoming A Judge: Socialization to the Judicial Role, 69 
JUDICATURE 139 (Oct.-Nov. 1985); David Richert, Federal-State Educational Programs, 86 
JUDICATURE 172 (Nov.-Dec. 2002); Franklin M. Zweig & Diane E. Cowdrey, Educating Judges for 
Adjudication of New Life Technologies, 83 JUDICATURE 157 (Nov.-Dec. 1999); Jack B. Weinstein, The 
Contribution of Henry G. Manne Towards the Education of the American Judiciary, 50 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 421 (1999). 
 34 See Reiss, supra note 22, at 571-72.  Limited analyses of judicial self-regulation exist, although 
they focus primarily on issues relating to removal and discipline of judges.  See Amanda Frost, Judi-
cial Ethics and Supreme Court Exceptionalism, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 443 (2013); Peter M. Shane, 
Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 
233 (1993). 
 35 See infra notes 65-102 and accompanying text. 
 36 Other commentators have discussed these issues at more length.  See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 
110-14. 
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A.  Lack of Consensus Regarding the Role of Judges in U.S. Courts 
The first issue to consider involves the lack of consensus about what consti-
tutes “good” or “appropriate” judging.37  This debate, which includes both practi-
cal
38
 and theoretical elements,
39
 is both central and preliminary to the question of 
judicial education, since a judicial curriculum cannot be developed without 
agreement on the types of skills and attributes that should be taught.
40
 
Up until this point, the only subject that has won universal acceptance as an 
appropriate topic for judicial education involves courses concerning recent devel-
opments in substantive or procedural law.
41
  While no one doubts that judges must 
be competent in both content and procedure, this educational approach suggests 
that legal expertise is the sole hallmark of a good judge.  In fact, judges do much 
more than simply apply the law in a mechanistic manner.
42
  Instead, judges must 




                                                          
 37 See Lippman, supra note 19, at 4 (noting that the role of judiciary goes beyond mere adjudica-
tion).  Even the American Bar Association (ABA) is unable to determine this issue with any degree of 
specificity, as demonstrated by its model code of judicial conduct, which includes only four canons, 
which are all quite general.  See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, ABA 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_
conduct.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2015).  Some academic studies into the nature of judging do exist, 
although they, too, could be expanded upon.  See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Proce-
dural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1385-91 (2012); Lippman, supra note 19, at 
1; Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 896 (2012); 
Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 
1303-17 (2008); S.I. Strong, Limits of Procedural Choice of Law, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1027, 1062-
63, 1076-81 (2014). 
 38 For example, numerous questions arise with respect to evidentiary concerns, such as the adequa-
cy of eyewitness testimony or the effect of implicit bias on adjudication.  See Brandon L. Garrett, 
Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 451, 451-52 (2012); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing 
Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 481-82 (2010); see also 
Andrea L. McArdle, Using a Narrative Lens to Understand Empathy And How It Matters In Judging, 
9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 173 (2012); Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examin-
ing Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decision-Making, 85 SO. CAL. L. REV. 313, 
323 (2012). 
 39 For example, one of the key controversies involves the question of whether judges should focus 
solely on the merits of the case in front of them or whether they should consider the development of 
the common law in a particular field.  See Ethan J. Lieb et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 
CAL. L. REV. 699, 700 (2013); Strong, Writing, supra note 9, at 113. 
 40 See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 148; Cowdrey, supra note 33, at 890. 
 41 This issue goes to the competence of the judiciary, as noted in the ABA Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct.  See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 37, Canon 2.  However, there is 
growing support for courses concerning certain types of “‘judge craft’ - the specific skills judges need 
to do their job, including skills training in areas such as opinion writing, sentencing, dealing with 
certain types of litigants and evidence.”  THOMAS, supra note 17, at 13-17. 
 42 See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 7-8; THOMAS, supra note 17, at 13-17. 
 43 See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 13-17.  Debate often arises as to whether certain characteris-
tics—including those, such as integrity and independence, that are believed to be fundamental to good 
judging—are either inherent (and therefore not susceptible to educational efforts) or adequately ad-
dressed through the judicial selection process.  See Mary L. Clark, Judicial Retirement and Return to 
Practice, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 841, 844 (2011) (noting importance of judicial integrity, independence 
and impartiality); see also ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 37, Canon 1 (“A judge 
shall uphold and promote the, independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”); id. at Canon 2 (“A judge shall perform the duties of 
judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently.”). 
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If judicial education is intended to address judicial performance as a whole, 
then those persons involved in the development of a judicial curriculum must 
understand what it is that judges do.
44
  However, the process is inadequately un-
derstood by both judges
45
 and legal academics.
46
  As a result, it is difficult or im-
possible to answer many of the core questions involving judicial education. 
B.  Excessive Reliance on Judicial Selection As a Predictor of Judicial 
Competence 
Although there may not be much research concerning what it means to be a 
judge, there is a considerable amount of scholarship concerning the process of 
selecting judges.
47
  Traditionally, the United States has placed a great deal of em-
phasis on judicial selection procedures as a means of identifying candidates who 
will have a successful career on the bench.
48
  However, a number of concerns 
have been raised about whether and to what extent judicial selection procedures 
can actually be relied upon to produce good judges.
49
  Some commentators have 
gone so far as to conclude that “no selection method can guarantee the continued 
fitness of the judiciary.”50 
However, society does not need to rely on the judicial selection process as the 
exclusive means of ensuring good judicial performance.  Instead, judicial educa-
tion can provide additional, and in many ways more direct, means of improving 
                                                          
 44 See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 14-15. 
 45 For example, “even the most learned judges have acknowledged that they do not understand how 
judges make decisions.”  Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 782 
(2001). 
 46 Some preliminary work has been done on these subjects, although much of the existing analysis 
is from judges themselves.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2010); Chris Guthrie et al., 
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Chris Guthrie, 
Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420 (2007); Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First 
Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049 (2006); Edward Rubin, The Real Formalists, the Real Realists, and 
What They Tell Us About Judicial Decision Making and Legal Education, 109 MICH. L. REV. 863 
(2011); Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons From Judge Cardozo, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1629 (2010).  While useful, more work is warranted, particularly from academ-
ics.  See supra note 33 (noting that although the judicial perspective is useful, independent analysis of 
judicial functions is also important).  The lack of academic involvement in these issues has been seen 
as problematic.  See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 113 (“One critic has drawn a connection between the 
need for reform in the field of continuing education for judges . . . and the lack of academic interest in 
judicial studies . . . .  He maintains that university research on the efficiency of the judicial system, on 
the sociological background of the judiciary, on recruitment, evaluation, promotion, and even on the 
acceptance of the courts by the public is almost non-existent, and there have been few major develop-
ments in this field since the 1970s.”). 
 47 For example, commentators have noted the potentially detrimental role that politics can play in 
both judicial elections and judicial appointments.  See Norman L. Greene, Perspectives From the Rule 
of Law and International Economic Development: Are There Lessons For Reform of Judicial Selection 
in the United States? 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 53, 112-14 (2008); Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judg-
es, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2184-85 (2006); Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic 
Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 586-87 (2005); Joanna M. 
Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too? 58 DUKE L. J. 1589, 1592 (2009). 
 48 See Kadens, supra note 1, at 143-45. 
 49 See Wayne Doane, Note, The Membership of Judges in Gender Discriminatory Clubs, 12 VT. L. 
REV. 459, 461 (1987); see also Fisher, supra note 8, at 164. 
 50 Doane, supra note 49, at 461; see also Fisher, supra note 8, at 164 (concluding many judges 
“turn out to be ill-suited for the job,” despite having survived rigorous selection procedures). 
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performance on the bench.
51
  Unfortunately, the current fixation with judicial se-
lection procedures has usurped the more logical debate about judicial education as 
a means of ensuring and promoting excellence in judging.  So long as judicial 
selection is seen as a proxy for judicial competence, the discussion about judicial 
education will be shortchanged. 
C.  Concerns About Judicial Independence 
The final issue to consider involves judicial independence.  Traditionally, 
judges in the United States have opposed mandatory forms of judicial education 
on the grounds that such practices infringe upon judicial independence.
52
  Fur-
thermore, concerns about judicial independence have also affected determinations 
about who is to develop educational programming for judges.  Thus, Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist once went so far as to claim that “[j]udicial independence is 
enhanced when the third branch controls judicial education, research and plan-
ning.”53 
Given this background, it is perhaps understandable that some academics 
might hesitate before involving themselves in the debate over judicial education.  
Even so, commentators have long recognized that judicial independence can be 
carried too far and devolve into judicial hubris.
54
  As a result, it is necessary to 
determine whether assertions about the need to protect judicial independence are 
legitimate or whether judicial independence is being used as a stand-in for other, 
perhaps less praiseworthy concerns.
55
 
One reason why some judges may resist anything other than purely voluntary 
forms of judicial education may be the belief that judicial education diminishes 
the prestige or “mystique” of the judiciary and thereby damages the legitimacy of 
the institution.
56
  However, it is possible to view judicial education efforts not as 
evidence of a failing judiciary but instead as a means of ensuring a competent and 
                                                          
 51 See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 13-17. 
 52 Mandatory judicial education can relate either to the need to undertake some form of judicial 
education (regardless of content) or specific types of judicial education (such as that relating to implicit 
bias, domestic violence, etc.).  See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 171. 
 53 William H. Rehnquist, 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 18 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 499, 507 (1995).  Some commentators have also suggested that judicial education not only 
does not infringe on judicial independence but can actually enhance it.  See James B. Eaglin & Mat-
thew Alex Ward, Enhancing the Administration of Justice and Strengthening Judicial Independence 
Through Independent, Judicial-Based Research Centers, 7 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 77, 108 
(2014); see also RUSSELL WHEELER, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: ITS RELATION TO JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 42 (1988). 
 54 See Andrew M. Hall, Book Review, Lusky and the Long Dark Road, 11 J. L. & POL. 213, 214 
(1995); Maimon Schwarzschild, Judicial Independence and Judicial Hubris, in THE CULTURE OF 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 177, 178 
(Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012); see also Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, 
Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 587, 588-90, 594 (2009); Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 733, 768 (2004) (“Common themes in discussions of judges include their tendency to become 
arrogant . . . .”). 
 55 See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. 
 56 See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 29; Kadens, supra note 1, at 143. 
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well-informed bench.
57
  Indeed, judicial education has been said to be an effective 
means of promoting public confidence in the judiciary.
58
 
Another reason why judges may resist mandatory forms of judicial education 
may be due to content-based concerns.
59
  For example, some judges may believe 
that they do not need instruction on a particular issue or that the material in ques-
tion is somehow inappropriate for a judge to consider.
60
  However, social science 
research indicates that judges often are unaware of certain gaps in their 
knowledge.
61
  Concerns regarding “inappropriate” instruction also appear inapt 
because the primary function of a judge is to distinguish between relevant and 
irrelevant material.  Indeed, some judges have accepted invitations to attend in-
dustry-sponsored judicial education programs at luxury resorts based on the claim 
that, as judges, they are fully capable of distinguishing between objective educa-
tional material and special interest group propaganda.
62
    
D.  Effects of the Invisible Barriers to Research Concerning Judicial Edu-
cation 
Although the discussion in the preceding subsections is quite brief, the under-
lying sentiments run deep within the judiciary and thus should be taken quite seri-
ously.  However, it is in many ways easier to explain the rationales behind various 
obstacles to research concerning judicial education than it is to justify their con-
tinued effect on legal scholarship.  In fact, allowing these invisible barriers to 
legal research to continue to bar critical commentary of judicial education would 
simply reinforce the “mystique” of the judiciary and allows judges to wield signif-




Finding the current approach to judicial education problematic does not re-
quire a determination that the judiciary is acting in bad faith.  Indeed, commenta-
tors have explicitly recognized that “regulatory capture can occur despite the de-
sire of public officials to protect the public.”64  Therefore, any analysis regarding 
                                                          
 57 See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 136. 
 58 See ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, supra note 16, at 55 (“There is more at 
stake here than simply promoting judicial competence. The continuing legitimacy of our judicial insti-
tutions requires that a process be in place to reassure the public that the judges who interpret our laws, 
rule on our civil claims, resolve disputes affecting our families, and sentence our citizens are capable 
and highly qualified.”); see also supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text. 
 59 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 60 To some extent, this objection may be ideologically based.  For example, conservative judges 
may be more opposed to judicial education programs attempting to demonstrate the existence and 
effect of implicit bias, since conservatives “may be more inclined than liberals to justify and use their 
implicit biases for explicit judgment.”  See Gregory S. Parks & Matthew W. Hughey, Opposing Af-
firmative Action: The Social Psychology of Political Ideology and Racial Attitudes, 57 HOW. L.J. 513, 
537 (2014). 
 61 See infra notes 85-90.  Social scientists have also determined that certain types of cultural out-
looks actually affect perceptions of fact.  See Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 107, 109 (2010) (discussing the work of Yale Law School’s Cultural Cognition Project) 
[hereinafter Secunda, Cultural Cognition]. 
 62 See Douglas T. Kendall & Eric Sorkin, Nothing for Free: How Private Judicial Seminars Are 
Undermining Environmental Protections and Breaking the Public’s Trust, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
405, 469-80 (2001). 
 63 Kadens, supra note 1, at 143. 
 64 Shapiro, supra note 26, at 222. 
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regulatory capture must focus on objective rather than subjective elements.  A 
number of those issues are considered in the following section. 
III.  JUDICIAL EDUCATION, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE AND JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF JUDICIAL EDUCATION 
Previously it was suggested that the paucity of academic research concerning 
judicial education could be due to the fact that the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s 
effectively resolved all of the important issues in this field.
65
  If true, then the 
question of regulatory capture could be considered moot, given that the definition 
of regulatory capture contemplates some sort of negative effect on the public.
66
  
However, as the following subsections suggest, judicial education in the United 
States does not appear to be problem-free. 
A.  Public Perception of Judicial Performance 
The first issue to consider is whether the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s have 
fully and finally fixed any problems associated with judicial education in the 
United States.  As it turns out, there is some evidence to support the conclusion 
that the judicial education system is operating at acceptable levels of efficiency 
and competence.  For example, public perception polls often suggest that the judi-
ciary is functioning relatively well, at least in comparison to other branches of 
government.
67
  However, closer examination of the data indicates that public per-
ception of judicial performance is not all that high when considered in absolute 
numbers.
68
  Furthermore, confidence in the courts is lowest among those with 
direct experience with the judicial system.
69
 
This information has triggered a number of questions about the quality of ju-
dicial performance in this country.
70
  While some criticisms of judges’ behavior 
(such as that relating to “judicial activism”) can be framed in political or ideologi-
cal terms,
71
 a number of content-neutral concerns have also been raised.
72
  Misgiv-
                                                          
 65 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
 66 See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. 
 67 See Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of and Support for the 
Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 900 (2007); The State of State Courts: A 2014 NCSC Public 
Opinion Survey, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (Dec. 4, 2014),  http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/ 
PDF/Topics/Public%20Trust%20and%20Confidence/2014-State-of-State-Courts-Survey-
12042014.ashx. 
 68 Although the judiciary tends to be rated more highly than other branches of government in 
public perception polls, the numbers—which often range from approximately 50 percent to 70 percent, 
depending on the question asked—are still relatively weak by any objective measure.  See Jamieson & 
Hennessy, supra note 67, at 900; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 67; see also Fisher, 
supra note 8, at 186-89. 
 69 See Jamieson & Hennessy, supra note 67, at 901-02; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra 
note 67, at 3. 
 70 See David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluation to Enhance Judicial Account-
ability, Judicial Independence, and Public Trust, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 115, 115 (2008); Jean E. 
Dubofsky, Judicial Performance Review: A Balance Between Judicial Independence and Public Ac-
countability, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 315 (2007); Fisher, supra note 8, at 186-89. 
 71 See Brody, supra note 70, at 116; see also Timothy M. Phelps, Federal Judges Faces Possible 
Impeachment, MSN (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/federal-judge-faces-
possible-impeachment/ar-AA9NGO6 (discussing a Republican-appointed federal judge who was 
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ings have also been expressed about judicial behavior from the bench, including 








Some people dismiss these types of issues as uncharacteristic of the judiciary 
as a whole.
76
  However, many if not all of these incidents could have been avoided 
if the individuals in question had received appropriate forms of judicial education 
before the episodes occurred.
77
  Thus, it does not appear as if the current approach 
to judicial education is entirely successful. 
B.  Judicial Perception of Judicial Performance 
Closer examination of the various types of problematic behaviors discussed 
above suggests that many can be traced back to the so-called “mystique” of the 
                                                          
denounced after putting a former Democratic government in manacles following a corruption convic-
tion). 
 72 For example, concerns have been enunciated about written decisions and opinions that are less 
than respectful of the parties and/or other members of judiciary.  See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes 
Are You Going To Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
837, 842 (2009) (noting that some interpretive methods “incur [a] cost to democratic legitimacy asso-
ciated with labeling the perspective of persons who share a particular cultural identity ‘unreasonable’ 
and hence unworthy of consideration in the adjudicatory process”).  Indeed, there is even a “sarcasm 
index” rating various judges.  See Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Tops Law Prof’s Sarcasm Index, ABA 
L.J. (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_tops_law_profs_sarcasm_index 
(noting that “heavy use of sarcasm can demean the court, and . . . arguably demonstrates . . . lack of 
respect for the legal opinions of . . . colleagues” (citation omitted)). 
 73 See Rene Stutzman, Brevard Judge Who Got Into Courthouse Fistfight Faces Formal Charges, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-
fighting-judge-brevard-20140814-story.html. 
 74 See Bill Chappell, Montana Judge is Publicly Censured Over 30-Day Sentence For Rape, NPR 
(July 22, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/07/22/334069164/montana-judge-is-
publicly-censured-over-30-day-sentence-for-rape; Lynn Hecht Schafran, There’s No Accounting for 
Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 1063-65, 1067 (1995). 
 75 See Valerie Richardson, Scalia Defends Keeping God, Religion in Public Square, WASH. TIMES 
(Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/1/justice-antonin-scalia-defends-
keeping-god-religio/?page=all (quoting U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia as saying: “What 
can they do to me?  I have life tenure.”). 
 76 For example, the judge who engaged in the fistfight was said to have acted out of character and 
was sent to anger management training.  See Dan Kedmey, Florida Judge Deals Out Justice With His 
Fists, TIME (June 3, 2014), http://time.com/2818369/florida-judge-courtroom-fight/; see also supra 
note 73.  Although some types of bad behavior (such as Justice Scalia’s heavy-handed use of sarcasm 
and other demeaning tactics) are supported by certain members of the lay and legal communities, 
commentators have suggested that actions not only injure the judiciary but appear to have harmed the 
judge in question.  See Garrett Epps, The Twilight of Antonin Scalia, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/the-twilight-of-antonin-scalia/378884/ (suggest-
ing that Justice Scalia’s influence is waning); Kahan et al., supra note 72, at 842-43; Weiss, supra note 
72. 
 77 See Kathleen E. Mahoney, The Myth of Judicial Neutrality: The Role of Judicial Education in 
the Fair Administration of Justice, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 785, 815 (1996); Paul M. Secunda, Cogni-
tive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing Strategies, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 373, 375 (2012) [here-
inafter Secunda, Debiasing].  Of course, judicial education will only resolve such issues if the judges in 
question are required to attend educational programming.  Supreme Court justices, such as Justice 
Scalia, are not required to undergo any type of judicial education.  Indeed, Justice Scalia has been 
known to teach judicial education courses, including those relating to judicial writing, despite criticism 
of his writing style.  See Duke Law, Center for the Study of Judicial Studies, Faculty for Summer 
2013, http://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/degree/faculty/ (listing Justice Scalia as teaching a course on 
judicial writing); see also Kahan et al., supra note 72, at 842-43; Weiss, supra note 72. 
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judge.”78  While the aura surrounding judges may contribute to a necessary sense 
of respect for the judiciary,
79
 such sentiments can be problematic if they generate 
overconfidence (sometimes described in the literature as “judicial hubris”) that 
results in questionable judicial practices.
80
  Although judges are not the only ones 
prone to overconfidence, commentators have suggested that “one can make a per-
suasive argument that the natural human foibles such as . . . overconfidence . . . 
become exacerbated, rather than reduced, because of the isolation in which judges 
work and the pedestal upon which they are placed.”81  Judges may also be inclined 
to overestimate the importance of intellectual prowess over interpersonal and oth-
er types of skills necessary to the art of judging.
82
 
Concerns about overconfidence among judges are particularly relevant to the 
current discussion because judges in the United States are largely in control of 
their own educational agendas, both individually and institutionally.
83
  Some 
judges (most notably those on the federal bench) do not ever need to undertake 
any form of judicial education.
84
 
A system that allows individuals to choose for themselves the content and 
timing of their professional education is somewhat questionable in light of re-
search indicating that persons “who are overconfident . . . make poor [educational] 
choices compared to learners who are uncertain about their knowledge.”85  The 
situation is further exacerbated by the fact that some supremely overconfident 
people—particularly those who are given a great deal of deference in their jobs—
are highly unlikely to learn from experience.
86
 
                                                          
 78 Kadens, supra note 1, at 143; see also supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. 
 79 See Fried, supra note 1, at 1227. 
 80 See Jeffrey M. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification – And a 
Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive 
Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 741, 744 (2011); see also supra note 54 
and accompanying text. 
 81 Stempel, supra note 80, at 744. 
 82 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.  Some authorities suggest that “[s]mart people 
overestimate the importance of being a smart person.”  Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyers in Failed Firms 
Overestimated the Importance of Being Smart, Law Dean Says, ABA J. (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www. 
abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers_in_failed_firms_overestimate_the_importance_of_being_smart_l
aw_dean (quoting Dean Frank Wu of Hastings Law School). 
 83 Most states mandate some form of judicial education for sitting judges, although the require-
ments are set at the local level and can vary widely.  See NAT’L JUDICIAL EDUC. PROGRAM, supra note 
14, at 15; ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 13, 29-40; Murrell & Gould, supra note 14, at 136.  As a 
result, judges in both state and federal court are usually allowed to choose their own curriculum.  The 
concept of mandatory judicial education remains fraught, even though some people believe that judi-
cial education should be considered part of a judge’s continuing ethical duty.  See NAT’L JUDICIAL 
EDUC. PROGRAM, supra note 14, at 15 (“Judicial education is essential to judges’ ability to meet the 
obligations of Canon 3: A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligent-
ly.”); see also id. (noting some judges find mandatory judicial education “insulting”). 
 84 Although incoming federal judges are not required to attend new judge orientations offered by 
the FJC, most do.  However, there is no continuing judicial education requirement for federal judges 
and no systematic approach to developing certain skills. 
 85 Jennifer M. Cooper, Smarter Law Learning:  Using Cognitive Science to Maximize Law Learn-
ing, 44 CAP. U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016). 
 86 See Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, 
CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 693 (2005).  Empirical evidence also 
shows that those persons (such as judges) who are more socially dominant are more confident in their 
judgments, regardless of actual ability.  See Stephen V. Burks et al., Overconfidence and Social Signal-
ling, 2013 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 4. 
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Overconfidence is not the only characteristic that affects decisions regarding 
educational programming.  For example, empirical studies suggest that individuals 
do not seek training in subjects they believe they have already mastered.
87
  Fur-
thermore, some issues, such as those relating to implicit bias, are extremely diffi-
cult to reach through voluntary training programs because “these cognitive pro-
cesses can operate implicitly, or at a level below conscious awareness, . . . [and 
thus] can bias judgment and behavior in ways that go unnoticed by the individu-
al.”88  As a result, those judges who do not believe that they are prone to implicit 
bias or who do not find such biases problematic may not choose to receive train-
ing in this particular subject matter area,
89
 even though social scientists and judi-
cial education experts all agree that “[e]veryone, judges . . . included, harbors 
attitudes and stereotypes that influence how he or she perceives and interacts with 
the social world.”90 
C.  Judicial Education and Judicial Performance 
Problems associated with overconfidence, implicit bias and similar issues can 
be addressed through educational measures.
91
  However, a voluntary, judge-led 
system of education does not seem to be well-suited to resolving these sorts of 
matters, since those persons who are most in need of instruction on particular 
issues are perhaps least likely to choose programming on those topics.
92
  Indeed, 
many judges find certain forms of judicial education “insulting” and “strenuously 
oppose” efforts to impose any educational requirements on the judiciary.93 
This phenomenon raises a second type of concern, namely the control that the 
judiciary exerts over the content of judicial education.  At this point, most of the 
faculty on judicial education courses are judges themselves, even if the judges 
have no special expertise in education or in the subject matter under discussion.
94
  
                                                          
 87 See Cooper, supra note 85.  Furthermore, students who believe themselves to be under time 
pressure (as many sitting judges are) often choose not to focus on material that they believe will be 
difficult to learn.  See id. 
 88 Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias: Resources for Education, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/ibeducation (last visited Aug. 7, 2015); see also Jerry Kang et al., Im-
plicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1146-48, 1172-79 (2012).  Similar problems 
occur with respect to domestic violence cases.  See Schafran, supra note 74, at 1075. 
 89 For example, conservative judges may be more opposed to judicial education programs attempt-
ing to demonstrate the existence and effect of implicit bias, since conservatives “may be more inclined 
than liberals to justify and use their implicit biases for explicit judgment.”  See Parks & Hughey, supra 
note 60, at 537. 
 90 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 88; see also Mahoney, supra note 77, at 815; 
Secunda, Cultural Cognition, supra note 61, at 109; Secunda, Debiasing, supra note 77, at 375. 
 91 See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case 
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 153 (2010); Mahoney, supra note 77, at 815; Secunda, 
Debiasing, supra note 77, at 375. 
 92 See Cooper, supra note 85. 
 93 NAT’L JUDICIAL EDUC. PROGRAM, supra note 14, at 15 (“Mandatory judicial education is a 
vexed question. Many judges find it insulting and strenuously oppose it.”); see also ARMYTAGE, supra 
note 12, at 29-40, 169. 
 94 See Wallace, Asia, supra note 17, at 856 (reflecting the judicial view that a variety of courses, 
including those regarding “avoiding bias . . . are more effectively taught by an experienced judge (even 
one without formal judicial education) than by an ‘expert’ or ‘professor’ who usually does not have 
practical experience and may be more inclined to ‘lecture’ than to ‘engage’ the learners”). 
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Although experts in judicial education recognize the benefits of including outside 
experts on faculty, the bias in favor of judges as faculty is overwhelming.
95
 
Those who act as faculty on judicial education programs obviously have a 
great deal of control over both the content and method of presenting the materi-
al.
96
  However, individual judges can affect the educational curriculum in other 
ways as well.  For example, judicial education in the United States is a highly 
susceptible subject to market pressures.
97
  Because judges can pick and choose 
which courses they will attend, any program that is considered too difficult or too 
controversial will likely be poorly attended, which decreases the likelihood that 
the program will be offered again in the future.
98
  Indeed, commentators have 
noted a significant lag in institutional adoption of programs that are seen as par-
ticularly challenging for judicial audiences.
99
  Notably, market pressures affect 
both for-profit and not-for-profit institutions, since both types of organizations are 
accountable for their curricular choices.
100
 
Judicial influence over the educational curriculum is pervasive not only at the 
individual level, but also at the institutional level, as illustrated by the number of 
judges serving on the advisory boards of organizations specializing in judicial 
education.
101
  Although judicial input into programming is of course necessary, 
“the conservative nature of the judicial branch, its many stakeholders, and its re-
sulting reluctance to change” can thwart efforts to improve or modify existing 
approaches to judicial education.
102
 
IV.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF REGULATORY CAPTURE 
Although more work needs to be conducted before a definitive conclusion can 
be reached, the various problems that remain unaddressed by the current approach 
to judicial education, the high degree of control currently wielded by the judiciary 
over judicial education and the resistance by judges to any independent, external 
                                                          
 95 Compare Schafran, supra note 74, at 1072 n.52 (“Effective judicial education requires a combi-
nation of expert presentation by judicial and nonjudicial faculty and interactive exercises in which 
judges practice applying their new knowledge.”) with Wallace, Asia, supra note 17, at 856. 
 96 Although judges are usually not responsible for developing the content of the courses they teach 
(that task is typically carried out by full-time staff members at the sponsoring organization), judicial 
faculty are free to interpret the materials provided to them in any way they like, and it is not uncom-
mon for judges to ignore some suggested material in favor of other issues. 
 97 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Refocusing Away From Rules Reform and Devoting More Attention to 
the Deciders, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 363 n.116 (2010). 
 98 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (noting that learners tend to avoid difficult materi-
al, if given the chance). 
 99 See Stempel, supra note 97, at 363 n.116. 
 100 For-profit institutions have an obvious financial interest in maximizing class attendance.  How-
ever, not-for-profit institutions may be under similar pressures to fill their courses, particularly if those 
organizations are subject to oversight from legislative or other bodies with control over the judicial 
education entity’s budget.  See 28 U.S.C. § 628 (2015) (noting appropriations and accounting proce-
dures for the FJC). 
 101 See 28 U.S.C. §621 (2015) (listing members of the supervisory board of the FJC); Faculty 
Council, NAT’L JUDICIAL COUNCIL, http://www.judges.org/about/faculty-council.html (last visited 
Aug. 7, 2015) (helping “ensure that quality teaching standards are maintained and that the curricula 
offered are relevant, challenging and invigorating to the College’s participants” and entirely made up 
of judges); see also 2014 FJC Annual Report, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 12, at 14 (listing mem-
bers of various FJC Committees, some of which are entirely made of judges). 
 102 Elizabeth Dennis, Leading Into the Future: Securing the Public Trust in Texas Courts, 51 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 839, 840 (2010). 
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oversight of judicial education suggest that this particular field has been subject to 
regulatory capture.
103
  The question, therefore, is what should be done now. 
Scholars have identified “three different responses to the problem of regulato-
ry capture: accountability, independence, and transparency.”104  Applying those 
principles to judicial education suggests a need for (1) increased external input 
over programming choices (independence); (2) increased mechanisms to measure 
whether and to what extent judges are engaging in appropriate forms of judicial 
education (accountability); and/or (3) increased publicity about the nature, quality 
and success of judicial education (transparency).  While these sorts of reforms 
obviously cannot be implemented overnight, there are a number of initiatives that 
can assist with the process. 
A.  Independence 
The first potential solution to regulatory capture—independence—
contemplates the need to establish a certain amount of distance between the regu-
latory entity and the regulated entity.  This goal can be achieved in the field of 
judicial education by allowing academics, experts and independent stakeholders to 
have a stronger voice in matters relating to judicial education.  Input should be 
sought not only regarding the content of judicial education but also the question of 
whether and to what extent mandatory programming is necessary.  Notably, this 
process cannot be initiated by or include members of either the legislative or ex-




When considering how best to implement this procedure, reformers can look 
to other countries that have successfully integrated outside voices into discussions 
about judicial education.  For example, Canada has adopted a “three pillar” ap-




B.  Accountability 
The second potential solution to regulatory capture—accountability—would 
require members of the regulated entity (i.e., judges) to be held accountable for 
their actions so as to minimize potential wrongdoing and encourage voluntary 
compliance with any necessary standards of behavior.  This issue has been already 
been discussed in the United States in the context of the debate about judicial 
                                                          
 103 See Reiss, supra note 22, at 571-72; see also supra notes 32-102 and accompanying text.  For 
example, more research needs to be conducted regarding the negative externalities generated by the 
current system, although reports regarding problematic judicial behavior suggest such evidence can be 
found.  See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. 
 104 Roger Van Den Bergh, Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in the Euro-
pean Community: The Case of Competition Policy, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 363, 378 (1996); see 
also Shapiro, supra note 26, at 249-55 (noting also that creating the political will for reform is im-
portant). 
 105 See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & MORTON ROSENBERG, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF JUDGES 
AND JUSTICES (May 31, 2005), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32935.pdf (discussing scope 
and limits on congressional oversight of the federal judiciary). 
 106 See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 50. 
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evaluation procedures that could identify areas where improvement in judicial 
practices is needed, either by individual judges or the judiciary as a whole.
107
 
Although judicial assessments are routinely conducted in civil law jurisdic-
tions,
108
 judges in the United States have traditionally resisted such measures 
based on concerns about judicial independence
109
 and separation of powers.
110
  
However, some commentators have claimed that judicial evaluations can increase 




A full-fledged debate about the propriety of judicial evaluation programs is 
beyond the scope of the current Essay.  However, some experts in judicial educa-
tion have avoided these types of concerns by suggesting the use of needs assess-
ments rather than judicial evaluations to determine what type of judicial pro-
gramming would be useful to judges.
112
 
C.  Transparency 
The third response to regulatory capture—transparency—would involve in-
creased knowledge and scrutiny of both the content and the process of judicial 
education in this country.  The burden for this particular process will likely fall to 
the academic community, although other members of civil society could also par-
ticipate in the dissemination and analysis of information about judicial education 
procedures. 
Although there is much yet to be done in this regard, there have been a num-
ber of recent efforts that could increase transparency regarding judicial educa-
                                                          
 107 See STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT: REGARDING A JUDICIAL 
EVALUATION FORM, 3 HAW. B.J. 9 (1999); Eaglin & Ward, supra note 53, at 78-88; Shepherd, supra 
note 47, at 1592.  However, measuring the quality of judicial decision-making is a difficult task, since 
many issues are subjective or are outside the judge’s control.  See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 23, 32 (2004); Frank B. Cross & Stephanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 
1388-99 (2009) (discussing “productivity, quality and independence” as relevant criteria and noting 
criticism of research methodologies); Chad M. Oldfather, Against Accuracy (As A Measure of Judicial 
Performance), 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 493, 494-95 (2014). 
 108 See THOMAS, supra note 17, at 115. 
 109 See Shepherd, supra note 47, at 1592; THOMAS, supra note 17, at 115.  The concern is that 
material gained from judicial evaluations could be used for punitive purposes, particularly in jurisdic-
tions where judges are subject to re-election.  See Shepherd, supra note 47, at 1592.  However, judicial 
evaluations can be used for more benign purposes.  See Eaglin & Ward, supra note 53, at 78-88 (dis-
cussing judicial research centers). 
 110 See BAZAN & ROSENBERG, supra note 105, at 1-6. 
 111 See Penny J. White, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to Supplement Inappropriate Voter 
Cues and Enhance Judicial Legitimacy, 74 MO. L. REV. 635, 652-54 (2009). 
 112 See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 67-83 (discussing pros and cons of needs assessments as well 
as various methodologies); see also Good Judicial Training Practices, EUROPEAN JUDICIAL TRAINING 
NETWORK, http://www.ejtn.eu/Resources/Good-judicial-training-practices/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2015) 
(containing various types of needs assessments).  Still, assessing the needs of the judiciary can be a 
difficult task.  See Shirley A. Dobbin et al., Surveying Difficult Populations: Lessons Learned From A 
National Survey of State Trial Court Judges, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 287, 287-304 (2001); see also Frank M. 
Coffin & Robert A. Katzmann, Steps Towards Optimal Judicial Workways: Perspectives From the 
Federal Bench, 59 N.Y. UNIV. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 377, 391-92 (2003).  Although it is useful to ask 
judges what issues they find most important, one cannot rely exclusively on self-assessment to deter-
mine educational needs and goals.  See Dobbin et al., supra note 112, at 288. 
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tion.
113
  One of the more useful of these initiatives involves a recent symposium 
organized by the University of Missouri’s Center for the Study of Dispute Resolu-
tion and entitled “Judicial Education and the Art of Judging: From Myth to Meth-
odology.”  The symposium generated a number of articles relating to judicial edu-
cation and provided numerous insights into how the current system can be im-
proved.  The contributions to this symposium fell into three basic categories and 
addressed a number of issues raised in this Essay. 
First, a number of papers, including “Judging as Judgment:  Tying Judicial 
Education to Adjudication Theory” by Professor Robert Bone and “Of Judges, 
Law, and the River:  Tacit Knowledge and the Judicial Role” by Professor Chad 
Oldfather, considered the often-overlooked question of what it means to be a 
judge.
114
  As noted previously, this issue is critical to questions relating to judicial 
education, since it is impossible to develop an appropriate curriculum without 
knowing what it is that judges do.
115
  Indeed, Professor Bone made a direct con-
nection between these two concepts, stating 
[t]he choice of curriculum depends on controversial assumptions about 
what constitutes good judging.  This means that one must first formulate a 
reasonably coherent conception of good judging before one can design 
effective judicial education courses.  It is not enough merely to teach a 
menu of different options from which judges can choose.  Proper 
adjudication is not something individual judges decide as a matter of 
personal preference or conviction.  A judge has a duty, by virtue of her 
role within the existing system of adjudication, to act in a manner 
consistent with the core principles and practices of that institution.  As a 
result, she has an obligation to formulate a theory of adjudication that fits 
the institution in a normatively attractive way.
116
 
Professor Oldfather also considered the connection between judicial educa-
tion and the art of judging.  He framed the challenge of educating judges as in-
volving three different elements: 
The first is that the law affords a great deal of discretion to judges.  
Sometimes this is by design, and sometimes it is a product of the inherent 
underdeterminacy of much law.  The second is that in exercising this dis-
cretion judges are susceptible to an array of unconscious influences often 
regarded as illegitimate, and that if unchecked threaten to undermine the 
rule of law.  The third is that the inarticulable nature of judicial decision-
making means that good judging necessarily entails drawing on another 
                                                          
 113 For example, the dissolution of the American Judicature Society in 2014 put the future of “Judi-
cature,” one of the preeminent publications in the area of judicial studies, at risk.  However, Duke Law 
School has agreed to take over publication of the journal through Duke’s Center for Judicial Studies.  
See Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies to Assume Publication of Judicature, DUKE L. NEWS (Nov. 
20, 2014), http://law.duke.edu/news/duke-law-center-judicial-studies-assume-publication-judicature/. 
 114 See Robert G. Bone, Judging as Judgment: Tying Judicial Education to Adjudication Theory, 
2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 129 [hereinafter Bone, Judging]; Chad M. Oldfather, Of Judges, Law, and the 
River: Tacit Knowledge and the Judicial Role, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 155 [hereinafter Oldfather, Judi-
cial Role]. 
 115 See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. 
 116 Bone, Judging, supra note 114, at 152. 
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sort of unconscious influence—in this case, one that we want to celebrate 
and cultivate.  The challenge thus stems from the need to give play to 
some unconscious influences but not others, and it is complicated by the 
fact that the line between legitimate and illegitimate influences is both 
blurry and contestable.
117 
A second set of articles from the symposium focused on the goals and pur-
poses of judicial education.  Contributions in this category included “What Judges 
Want and Need: User-Friendly Foundations for Effective Judicial Education” by 
the Honorable Duane Benton, “Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge” by Profes-
sor Kathleen Mahoney, “International Arbitration, Judicial Education and Legal 
Elites” by Professor Catherine Rogers, “Toward a New Paradigm of Judicial Edu-
cation” by the Honorable Mary Russell and “Writing Reasoned Decisions and 
Opinions: A Guide For Novice, Experienced and Foreign Judges” by Professor 
S.I. Strong.
118
  Although a few scholars have previously touched on questions 
relating to the judicial curriculum,
119
 the contributions from the symposium took a 
significant step forward in identifying topics of particular concern to judges.
120
 
The articles come at curricular issues from a wide range of perspectives.  For 
example, two authors considered judicial education from an international and 
comparative standpoint.  This approach is particularly intriguing because the 
United States is often considered an “exporter” of judicial education programming 
and innovations.
121
  However, there is much that can be learned from other juris-
dictions, particularly the National Judicial Institute (NJI) of Canada
122
 and the 
European Judicial Training Network (EJTN),
123
 which both provide excellent 
examples of how to develop a sophisticated curriculum for judges that includes 
both substance and skills. 
The Canadian perspective was reflected in the article written by Professor 
Mahoney, who provided a number of insights into how Canada is handling mat-
ters relating to implicit bias concerning race, gender and class.
124
  Professor Rog-
                                                          
 117 Oldfather, Judicial Role, supra note 114, at 156-57. 
 118 See Duane Benton & Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman, What Judges Want and Need: User-
Friendly Foundations for Effective Judicial Education, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 23; Kathleen Mahoney, 
Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 43; Catherine A. Rogers, International 
Arbitration, Judicial Education and Legal Elites, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 71; Mary R. Russell, Toward a 
New Paradigm of Judicial Education, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 79; Strong, Writing, supra note 9, at 93. 
 119 Existing scholarship is relatively sparse.  See Rosemary Cairns Way & Daphne Gilbert, Resist-
ing the Hidden Curriculum: Teaching for Social Justice, 2 CANADIAN LEGAL EDUC. ANN. REV. 1 
(2008); Rosemary Cairns Way, Reconceptualizing Professional Responsibility: Incorporating Equali-
ty, 25 DALHOUSIE L.J. 27 (2002); Fisher, supra note 8, at 189-201 (discussing the concept, content and 
rationale of introductory judicial education); J. Clifford Wallace, The Globalization of Judicial Educa-
tion, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 355, 358-59 (2003) [hereinafter Wallace, Globalization]. 
 120 See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. 
 121 See Rule of Law Initiative (ROLI), ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law. 
html (last visited Aug. 7, 2015); USAID: JUDICIAL REFORM & GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, 
http://www.jrga.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=65&Itemid=28&lang=e
n (last visited Aug. 7, 2015); Strong, Writing, supra note 9, at 96; Wallace, Globalization, supra note 
119, at 364. 
 122 See NAT’L JUDICIAL INST., https://www.nji-inm.ca/index.cfm/judicial-education/the-nji-s-
judicial-education-portfolio/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2015) (including a course calendar that discusses the 
“craft of judging,” including judge craft, court craft and professional craft). 
 123 See European Judicial Training Network Methodologies, EJTN, http://www.ejtn.eu/ 
Methodologies--Resources/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2015). 
 124 See id. 
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ers took more of an international approach and considered whether and to what 
extent judicial education about a particular international dispute resolution proce-
dure (i.e., international arbitration) can improve judicial practices involving do-
mestic disputes.  Among other things, Professor Rogers noted that 
[i]t is often assumed that the only form of judicial education needed for 
international arbitration is training on how to keep judicial “hands off” 
arbitration proceedings and outcomes.  International arbitration reforms, 
however, integrate judges into various aspects of reforms, which in turn 
provide potential inspiration for improvements in local judiciaries.
125
 
The discussion about curriculum development then shifted from international 
to institutional concerns.  Thus, Chief Justice Russell wrote about how state court 
judges can obtain innovative educational programming through creative statewide 
initiatives
126
 while Judge Benton offered two different proposals—one relating to 
judicial evaluations and one relating to educational vouchers—intended to im-
prove the current educational model.
127
 
The analysis also included an article involving judicial education at the indi-
vidual level.  As that submission recognized, many judges have extraordinarily 
busy dockets and “find it hard to make the time to attend in-person seminars, par-
ticularly given expanding workloads and decreasing budgets.  For those people, a 
published guide . . . may be the best way to trigger new ways of thinking” about 
particular issues.
128
  That article focused primarily on issues relating to judicial 




The third and final topic covered by the symposium involved not content but 
methodology.  Papers falling under this heading included “Educating Judges: 
Where To From Here?” by Dr. Livingston Armytage and “Judicial Education: 
Pedagogy for a Change” by Professor Brettel Dawson.130  These contributions 
discussed best practices in judicial education, as informed by research into adult 
learning practices and the distinctive attributes of judges as learners.
131
  Educators 
who incorporate these proposals into their training programs can help increase 
judicial confidence in judicial education by moving past the “talking head” model 
of professional programming and creating the sort of practical coursework that 
judges want and need.
132
 
                                                          
 125 Rogers, supra note 118, at 72. 
 126 See Russell, supra note 118, at 86. 
 127 See Benton, supra note 118, at 36. 
 128 Strong, Writing, supra note 9, at 128. 
 129 See id. 
 130 See Livingston Armytage, Educating Judges: Where To From Here? 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 167; 
T. Brettel Dawson, Judicial Education: Pedagogy for a Change, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 175. 
 131 See MALCOLM S. KNOWLES, THE MODERN PRACTICE OF ADULT EDUCATION: FROM PEDAGOGY 
TO ANDRAGOGY 45-49 (1980) (distinguishing andragogy, the teaching of adults, from pedagogy, the 
teaching of children); Joni Larson, The Intersection of Andragogy and Distance Education: Handing 
Over the Reins of Learning to Better Prepare Students for the Practice of Law, 9 T.M. COOLEY J. 
PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 117, 123-24 (2007).  These principles have been successfully applied in the 
context of judicial education.  See ARMYTAGE, supra note 12, at 106-11, 127-30. 
 132 See Wallace, Asia, supra note 17, at 856. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
As the preceding sections suggest, the field of judicial education is filled with 
controversies and challenges.  Indeed, reports suggest that the judiciary is current-
ly in a state of “crisis” because “most judges are ill-prepared for the challenges, 
personal and professional, of a judicial career, and many of them turn out to be ill-
suited for the job.”133  This may be in part because the field of judicial education 
appears to have stagnated since the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s.   While this 
phenomenon could be caused by a number of factors, regulatory capture of judi-
cial education by the judiciary would appear to be at least one possibility. 
Experts agree that a well-functioning judiciary is critical to the creation of an 
effective system of justice.
134
  Given the problems currently facing U.S. courts, it 
appears to be time to rethink strategies and methodologies that were put in place 
over forty years ago, during the first judicial education reform movement.
135
  Such 
efforts would not only help individual judges perform their duties better, but 
would go a long way toward improving public perception of and confidence in 
U.S. state and federal courts. 
 
                                                          
 133 Fisher, supra note 8, at 164. 
 134 See Lippman, supra note 19, at 1. 
 135 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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